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VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT:
DEFINING THE DEFERENCE DUE TO THE MILITARY
HONOR AND DECENCY ACT OF 1996 IN GENERAL MEDIA
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. COHEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech is so fundamentally essential to the preser-
vation of a stable government that the government itself is generally
prohibited from interfering with it.' But the power of Congress to
"raise and support Armies" under Article I, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution is also critical to the preservation of our liberties. 2 In cases of
1. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the right is funda-
mental, it is not absolute. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
("[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done.... The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic."). The free expression of
ideas is subject to restriction in order to protect the state from destruction or from
serious political, economic or moral injury. See id. Nevertheless, a state's valiant
attempt to ensure stable government will be closely scrutinized by a court, and
regulations restricting free speech are frequently found unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989) (holding Texas' interest in preventing
breaches of peace did not justify defendant's conviction for violation of flag dese-
cration statute when he burned American flag at protest rally). The Johnson
Court reassured that a principal "function of free speech under our system of gov-
ernment is to invite dispute." Id. at 408 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
4 (1949)). The Court explained that freedom of speech "may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Id. Espousing the principles
of free speech on behalf of the Court, Justice Brennan announced:
The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel
differently about these matters .... [A] nd, precisely because it is our flag
that is involved, one's response to the flag burner may exploit the
uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We can imagine no more
appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's own, no better
way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting the flag that
burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity of the flag that burned
than by... according its remains a proper burial. We do not consecrate
the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the free-
dom that this cherished emblem represents.
Id. at 419-20.
2. See United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 397 (1996) (stating that military
must defend national security and project international power). "The heart of a
free society depends upon national security and the ability to project power world-
wide." Id. Consequently, the role the United States assumes in international poli-
tics determines the security of the nation. See id. "In one sense, a nation's security
is not only dependent upon its reputation for power, but its willingness to project
power to preserve peace. Peace and power are not mutually exclusive but may be
considered as part of a continuum." Id.
(127)
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conflict between competing constitutional interests such as these,
courts have favored the military matters.A It is well settled that the
In the name of national security, the judiciary has previously upheld military
policies that were clearly discriminatory. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 214 (1944) (upholding military regulation placing Japanese-Americans
in internment camps due to security concerns during World War II).
3. For a comprehensive survey ofjudicial deference to the military, see Stanley
Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L. REv. 3 (1980)
(providing excellent survey of military deference). Courts often subordinate the
right to free speech to the military's need to maintain discipline. See id. This def-
erential standard has been called the doctrine of "military necessity." Id. Com-
mentators have referred to this practice as affording "substantial deference" to
internal military matters. See Thomas R. Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and
Free Exercise of Religion, 98 MIL. L. Rvv. 53, 75 (1982).
See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 733 (1974) (prioritizing military con-
cerns over free speech). In Levy, a commissioned Army medical officer refused to
train Special Forces personnel and instructed enlisted men to disobey orders to go
to Vietnam. See id. at 737. Levy was convicted by court-martial for conduct un-
becoming an officer and a gentleman. See id. Levy insisted that his remarks were
protected by the First Amendment. See id. In Levy, the Supreme Court rejected
this claim and stated that "a commissioned officer publicly urging enlisted person-
nel to disobey orders which might send them into combat" is "unprotected under
the most expansive notions of the First Amendment." Id. at 761.
The Court did not directly consider whether Levy's remarks created any par-
ticular degree of danger to military discipline. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 761. Instead, it
cited with approval the Court of Military Appeals' doctrine that speech which may
be protected in the civilian community may not be protected in the military con-
text if it undermines the effectiveness of response to command. See id. at 760-61.
In the civilian context, Levy's statements could not be penalized unless they cre-
ated danger of imminent disorder. See generally United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J.
797, 799 (1991) (holding speech that is protected in civil population may nonethe-
less undermine effectiveness of response to command and is not protected in mili-
tary); United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570 (1972) (holding that speech
that is tolerable in civilian context may not be tolerable in military context if it
creates clear and present danger); United States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63 (1970)
(holding that speech in military that promotes disloyalty to United States is not
protected); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (holding that military law is
separate from federal law and rights are preconditioned on unique needs of mili-
tary). Compare Levy, 417 U.S. at 760-61 with Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447-49 (1969) (holding that speech is protected until directed to inciting immi-
nent lawless action likely to produce such action).
Restraints on free speech in the military context also extend to expressive
conduct. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 (1968). The Supreme
Court has prohibited such conduct if it conflicts with the military's needs. See id. at
367. In O'Brien, the Supreme Court upheld a civilian's conviction for burning his
Selective Service registration card in a political demonstration. See id. at 386. The
Court relied on the administrative and practical importance of draft cards in
quickly and effectively preparing to defend the nation. See id. at 381. The Court
first confirmed that when actions involve both speech and non-speech factors, "a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. The
Court then evaluated the constitutionality of the regulation based upon four
requirements:
(1) whether the regulation is within the constitutional power of Congress;
(2) whether the regulation advances a meaningful or significant govern-
mental interest; (3) whether the purpose of the regulation is "unrelated
[Vol. 6: p. 127
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constitutional protections granted by the Bill of Rights are available
to the military only to a limited extent compared to their civilian
counterparts. 4 The Supreme Court has justified this difference in
treatment because of the military establishment's unique need to
maintain duty and discipline necessary for national security.5 Based
on these considerations, the Court has indicated that the military
can restrict the constitutional rights of its members to a greater ex-
tent than is permissible in a civilian context.6
to suppressing free expression"; and (4) if the regulation does restrict
free speech, whether it does so in the least suppressive way possible.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Under this analysis, the O'Brien Court upheld the government regulation
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards, finding that it did not violate O'Brien's
right to free speech. See id. at 377.
4. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 760-61 (providing less protection to speech in mili-
tary). These limitations apply not only to strategic defense matters such as the
protection of sailing dates and location of troops, but also to that part of the mili-
tary mission that prepares forces "to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
"The armed forces depend on a command structure that at times must com-
mit men to combat, not only hazarding their lives but ultimately involving the
security of the nation itself." Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. at 570. Speech that would nor-
mally be protected in the civilian context may not be protected in the military
context because it undermines the military effectiveness. See id.
5. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 760-61. "Society has long treated the military as a sepa-
rate community, distanced from civilian society by its elusive ideals, rigid standards
of conduct, and unique duty to protect national security." Alicia Christina Al-
meida, Note, Thomasson v. Perry: Has the Fourth Circuit Taken "Don't Ask Don't Tell"
Too Literally?, 75 N.C. L. RFv. 967, 967 (1997); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 300 (1983) (stating no military organization can function without strict disci-
pline and regulation that is unacceptable in civilian setting); Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975) (stating military necessity makes demands on its
personnel "without counterpart in the civilian life"); James M. Hirschhorn, The
Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.
L. REv. 177, 177 (1984) (discussing effect of military's separation from common
society on soldier's constitutional rights). For a complete discussion of the special
needs of the military and the compromising of constitutional protections, see gener-
ally David A. Schlueter, Gays and Lesbians in the Military: A Rationally Based Solution to
a Legal Rubik's Cube, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 393, 393 (1994) (discussing compro-
mising sexual expression); William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and the Military Ser-
vice: Legislation, Implementation, and Litigation, 64 UMKC L. REv. 121, 121 (1995)
(discussing sexual expression in military); Almeida, supra (discussing sexual ex-
pression in military); Felice Wechsler, Comment, Constitutional Lau-Goldman v.
Weinberger: Circumscribing the First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel, 30 ARiz.
L. REv. 349, 349 (1988) (discussing compromising freedom of religion).
6. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 759. Although the right to First Amendment free
speech does not stop at the gates of a military base, Congress has a legitimate
interest in restricting speech in order to uphold the military's image and core
values of honor, professionalism and discipline. See id. The Supreme Court an-
nounced that free speech is not protected under the First Amendment if the
speech undermines the effectiveness of the response to command. See id. Regard-
ing the military, the test is whether the speech interferes with or prevents the or-
derly accomplishment of the mission or presents a clear and present danger to the
loyalty, discipline, mission, or morale of the troops. See, e.g., United States v. Hart-
1999]
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The Court has just as clearly indicated that the military's discre-
tion is not completely unfettered by constitutional considerations
and judicial review. 7 Consequently, the Court has sought to accom-
modate the competing interests of military effectiveness and con-
stitutional rights under a principle of deference. 8 Although the
Court has repeatedly invoked the deference standard, it has not ad-
equately described its application. 9 As a result, extensive debate
surrounds whether particular departures from constitutional norms
are warranted. 10 In particular, there is confusion as to what degree
of deference is due when the military restricts the First Amendment
right to free speech by enacting a viewpoint-based regulation. Con-
sequently, the military's decision to censor sexual expression by en-
acting the Military Honor and Decency Act, has evoked debate.' 2
wig, 39 M.J. 125, 128 (1994) (stating that "clear and present danger" standard re-
quires different application in military context); Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. at 570
("speech that is protected in the civilian population may... undermine the effec-
tiveness of response to command.").
7. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (holding registration laws
excluding women do not violate equal protection, yet recognizing due process re-
quirements do apply in military context); Levy, 417 U.S. at 751 (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to court-martial conviction for urging fellow service person-
nel to disobey orders, yet noting that service personnel maintain most constitu-
tional rights while in armed forces); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 188 (1962) (stating that "citizens in uniform may not be
stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes").
8. For a discussion ofjudicial deference to the military, see infra notes 105-80
and accompanying text. This deferential standard had been called the doctrine of
"military necessity." For a complete survey of military deference, see Levine, supra
note 3, at 3. This practice has been referred to as affording "substantial deference"
to internal military matters. See Folk, supra note 3, at 75.
9. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court
substitutes hollow shibboleths about 'deference to legislative decisions' for consti-
tutional analysis."). See generally Mary Jo Donahue, First Amendment Rights in the
Military Context: What Deference is Due?-Goldman v. Weinberger, 20 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 85, 101 (1987) (noting that Supreme Court has not fashioned coherent test
to incorporate dual policies of judicial deference and constitutional responsibil-
ity); Susan A. Vallario, Note, Goldman v. Weinberger: Deference or Abdication ? 7 PAcE
L. REv. 531, 533 (1987) ("[T]he Goldman majority has abdicated its role by implic-
itly abandoning substantive interest-balancing in favor of absolute deference to
military judgement."); Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Person-
nel: Denying Rights To Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 855, 865 (1987) ("A
review of the development of [F]irst [A]mendment rights for the military shows
that what began as a weak but substantive review has degenerated into virtually no
review at all.").
10. See, e.g., Barney F. Bilello, Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers' Rights: Is The
Principle of Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HorsruA L. REv. 465 (1988) (arguing
that Supreme Court's failure to provide discemable parameters, rather than
Court's deferential review, presents problems).
11. 10 U.S.C. § 2489a (1996).
12. For a discussion of this debate, see infra notes 13-14 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 6: p. 127
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Participants in this debate question whether the military
should censor matters of sexual indecency. One commentator has
suggested that "no longer having wars to fight, the military has de-
cided to fight the devil instead."13 Another commentator has ques-
tioned whether the military is becoming too much like the Vati-
can.14 While such commentary reflects the ever increasing involve-
ment the military has taken with respect to the constitutional rights
of its members, this has not always been the case.' 5 For example,
during World War II, the military focused on morale, not morals.16
Ironically, sexual images actually played an important part.' 7 For
example, the "pin-up girl" was everywhere, doing her part to boost
13. Bill Press, The American Ayatollahs' War Against Love, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.),June 9, 1997, at A7; see also Ellen Goodman, Pentagon Theme When Saints Come
Marching In, FLORIDA TODAY, June 13, 1997, at l1A ("The new military theme song
is no longer 'From the Halls of Montezuma' but 'When the Saints Come Marching
In.'").
14. See E.J. DionneJr., Military's Sex War Not So Different From Society's, THE RFC-
oRD (Northern N.J.),June 12, 1997. In 1951, at the request of the Pentagon, Con-
gress adopted Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which crimi-
nalizes adultery in the military. See Press, supra note 13. The statute was aimed at
providing discipline through respect for superiors. See id. Congress intended to
prevent the breakdown of order on a base resulting from an adulterous affair be-
tween two military personnel. See id. Although the statute was not intended to
govern affairs between military personnel and civilians, it did. See id. This, how-
ever, has been the result. See id. Recently, a distinguished high ranking general
resigned from active duty after facing adultery charges for having sex with a civil-
ian five years earlier. See id.
15. SeeJames R. Petersen, Playboys's History of the Sexual Revolution: Part V, 1909-
1949, 44 PLAYaOY, Nov. 1, 1997.
16. See Petersen, supra note 15 passim. During World War II, "the roar of the
war machine tended to drown out prudes and puritans, but these people still
walked the perimeter." Id. at 17. The National Organization for Decent Literature
(NODL), an organization notorious for censoring sexual expression, waged a cam-
paign to ban all magazines that did "(1) glorify or condone reprehensible charac-
ters or reprehensible acts; (2) contain sexually offensive material; (3) feature illicit
love; (4) carry illustrations indecent or suggestive; or (5) advertise wares for the
prurient minded." Id. at 20. The NODL recruited base chaplains to examine base
newsstands and report magazines found offensive by NODL to the base com-
mander. See id. Most base commanders, however, shrugged off these complaints.
See id.
17. See Petersen, supra note 15 passim. Gary Valant, an art historian fascinated
by the particular kind of sexual expression called bomber art, explains the impulse
behind this image:
The origin of nose art goes back to some ancient time when the first
proud charioteer decorated his vehicle so that it would be distinguishable
from others. The desire to personalize an object, a machine, to make it
unique among the multitude, is basic to man's nature. Place man under
great stresses, give him a very uncertain future, and this desire can be-
come an obsession. So it is in war, and with the machines of war. A
thousand B-17's identical in every way roll off the assembly line and fly to
an uncertain fate, but each one can be different. The difference is not in
the tail number. Those are for record keepers and ribbon clerks. The
difference is in the imagination and talent of the crew. Few crew mem-
1999]
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morale.18 As more than one soldier commented, the pictures "give
us guys a good idea of what we are fighting for."19
Today, however, the popular myth that hormones rage un-
restricted in the military is changing.20 The military's old system is
not quietly accepted. 21 It has come under scrutiny from both
outside and inside the armed forces. 22 For example, offensive be-
havior that may have once been punished by a slap in the face, is
bers would talk about 247613 or 34356, but many tales would be told
about Sack Time or the Dragon Lady.
Id.
18. See Petersen, supra note 15, at 13. An estimated two million servicemen
ended up with the still shot of Betty Grable in a bathing suit. See id. at 14. Rita
Hayworth posed in lingerie for LIFE and became another favorite. See id. The 1944
Esquire pin-up calendar sold 2.5 million copies. See id. Morever, despite the ration-
ing of paper, which meant that magazines were printed in miniature versions, the
military insisted on receiving these calendars in full size. See id.
Soldiers placed pin-ups on the walls of their barracks, inside tanks and bomb-
ers, inside their helmets, on palm trees next to their shaving mirrors and in foot-
lockers. See id. The code breakers kept a huge collection of photos under glass on
their desks. See id. Some pin-ups were even attached to official intelligence reports
to insure that they would be read. See id.
19. Id. One commentator suggested that the pin-up had a special status for
many:
The extensive personal testimony to the emotional impact of World War
II suggests that what men and woman were fighting for had less to do
with abstract notions of freedom or patriotism than with the need to pro-
tect personal values represented by sweethearts, wives and families. Sex,
therefore, played an extensive role in the war experience. Whether with
its pin-ups of Hollywood stars, well-thumbed pictures of the girl back
home, Rosie the Riveter, the archetypal female factory worker, or women
pilots, World War II acquired an undeniable feminine aspect.
Id.
20. See Don Boyett, Military's Morality on Target, The Rules at Times Get Broken,
But Discipline Has a Purpose and Society Should Reflect on That, ORLANDO SEMINOLE,
June 8, 1997, at K1O (suggesting moral constraints benefit military).
21. See id. Education provides the most recent background for challenges to
military policy. Women have begun to contest the right of state funded military
schools to exclude females in the name of tradition and fraternity. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996) (challenging Virginia Military Insti-
tutes's exclusion of females under Equal Protection Clause); Faulkner v. Jones, 51
F.3d 440, 440 (4th Cir. 1996) (challenging Citadel's gender-based exclusionary
policies as violating Equal Protection Clause).
While women now constitute a significant portion of the armed services, they
still face many obstacles, including sexual harassment and gender discrimination.
See, e.g., James W. Crawley, Sex Barrier Lurks Below the Surface: First Female Submariner
Is Left High and Dry, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRJB., July 22, 1995, at Al (discussing mili-
tary's refusal to allow female officer to serve on an all-male submarine); Jackie
Spinner, Navy, Air Force to Review Explanation of Sexual Harassment Policy to Personnel,
WASH. Pos-r, Nov. 14, 1996, at A9 (recounting how rape reports have led military to
review sexual harassment policies).
22. See Boyett, supra note 20, at K10.
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now formally punished through sexual harassment laws.23 As a re-
sult, the military is currently reevaluating its policies and proce-
dures.
In General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen,24 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether Congress ex-
ceeded its constitutional authority by enacting the Military Honor
and Decency Act which banned the sale or rental of sexually ex-
plicit materials on military property.25 Part II of this Note examines
the text of the challenged Act.26 Part III provides the legal frame-
work the court utilized in making its decision. 27 It examines
whether the Act is an impermissible viewpoint-based regulation and
analyzes whether the principle of military deference provides an ex-
ception to permit viewpoint-based discrimination in the military fo-
rum. Part IV reviews the court's reasoning. 28 Part V offers a critical
analysis of the court's rationale.29 Finally, Part VI discusses the im-
pact of the decision and suggests that the court should have af-
forded the Act less deference.30
II. FACTS
The Military Honor and Decency Act of 199631 (the "Act"),
prohibits "the sale or rental of sexually explicit material on prop-
23. See Richard J. Chema, Arresting 'Tailhook'. The Prosecution of Sexual Harass-
ment in the Military, 140 MIL. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1993) (discussing prevalence of sexual
harassment in military).
24. 131 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 1997).
25. See id.
26. For a discussion of the Act's text, see infra notes 31-38 and accompanying
text.
27. For a discussion of the legal framework utilized by the court, see infra
notes 45-225 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 226-59 and ac-
companying text.
29. For a discussion of the court's reasoning and a critical analysis of that
rationale, see infra notes 260-89 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of why the court should have afforded the Act less defer-
ence, see infra note 290 and accompanying text.
31. 10 U.S.C. § 2489a (1996). The Act became effective on December 22,
1996 and provides in pertinent part:
(a) PROHIBITION OF SALE OR RENTAL. The Secretary of Defense
may not permit the sale or rental of sexually explicit material on property
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
(b) PROHIBITION OF OFFICIALLY PROVIDED SEXUALLY EXPLICIT
MATERIAL. A member of the armed forces or an employee of the De-
partment of Defense acting in an official capacity may not provide for
sale, remuneration, or rental of sexually explicit material to another
person.
(c) REGULATIONS. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regula-
tions to implement this section.
1999]
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erty under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense," which
includes military exchanges.32 The Act bans audio and video re-
cordings and periodicals with visual descriptions, produced in any
medium, but does not ban purely written material. 33 Significantly,
the Act does not ban all sexually explicit material in military ex-
changes.3 4 Nor does it ban all depictions of nudity.3 5 Instead, it
bans only the distribution of sexually explicit material, "the domi-
nant theme of which depicts or describes nudity... in a lascivious
way."36 The Act defines "lascivious" as "lewd and intended or
designed to elicit a sexual response."3 7 The regulations which ac-
company the Act instruct that "[m] aterial shall not be deemed sex-
ually explicit because of any message or point of view expressed
therein."3 8
(d) DEFINITIONS. In this section:
(1) the term "sexually explicit material" means an audio recording, or a
periodical with visual depictions, produced in any medium, the dominant
theme of which depicts or describes nudity, including sexual or excretory
activities or organs, in a lascivious way.
Id.
Pursuant to § 2489a(c) the Department of Defense issued regulations imple-
menting the Act that also became effective on December 22, 1996. See General
Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 276 at (1997). The Regula-
tions defined the following pertinent definitions:
1. MATERIAL. An audio recording, a film or video recording, or a peri-
odical with visual depictions, produced in any medium.
2. SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIAL. Material the dominant theme of
which is the depiction or description of nudity, including sexual or excre-
tory activities or organs, in a lascivious way.
3. DOMINANT THEME. A theme of any material that is superior in
power, influence, and importance to all other themes in the material
combined.
4. LASCIVIOUS. Lewd and intended or designed to elicit a sexual re-
sponse.
Id. at 276-77.
32. See 10 U.S.C. § 2489a(a). The Act further specifies that no officer or em-
ployee of the Department of Defense is to sell, rent or otherwise be compensated
for providing "sexually explicit material to another person." Id. at § 2489a(b). Sig-
nificantly, only the sale or rental of sexually explicit material on military property is
prohibited by the Act. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 277. Possession of such mate-
rial on military property is not prohibited. See id. Therefore, military personnel
may buy such material off military property or order it through the mail. See id.
33. See 10 U.S.C. § 2489a(a).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. General Media, 131 F.3d at 277.
38. Id. The regulations also established the "resale Activities Board of Review"
(the "Board"). See id. The Board reviews material offered for sale or rental on
military property and determines whether such material is "sexually explicit." Id.
Any material found to be sexually explicit must be withdrawn from the military
retail exchanges. See id.
[Vol. 6: p. 127
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The government argued that the sale of lascivious materials in
military exchanges could send the message that the military ap-
proves or endorses these materials.3 9 Sale of such materials could
tarnish "the military's image of honor, professionalism, and proper
decorum."4° The government argues that "[t]he military also en-
courages its personnel to 'lead by example' and to display the high-
est form of personal and professional conduct."41 This policy, the
government argues, could be undermined if military personnel be-
lieve that military commanders approved the sale of sexual materi-
als at military exchanges. 42
General Media Communications, Inc. (GMC), publishers of
Penthouse magazine, and other plaintiffs engaged in similar indus-
tries, challenged that the Act infringed on the First Amendment
right to free speech.43 The district court found that the Act was
unconstitutional and granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief.44 The
government appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
39. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 283. The Act prevents the sale of sexually
lascivious materials at military exchanges:
Military exchanges may include retail stores, garages, restaurants, beauty
shops, laundry facilities, newsstands, storage facilities, and recreational fa-
cilities. The exchanges are authorized to sell toiletries, stationary, cloth-
ing, jewelry, housewares, sporting goods, and automotive products, in
addition to books, periodicals, and audio and video tapes.
Id. at 275 n.1.
40. Id. at 284.
41. Id.
42. See id. Such an assumption would be true in the Navy, where resale regu-
lations specify that "adult" magazine titles stocked by the exchange are to be "coor-
dinated with the base commanding officer." General Media, 131 F.3d at 283-84
(citing 4 Navy Resale Manual § 4108(6) (a) (1)).
43. See General Media Communications, Inc. v. Perry, 952 F. Supp. 1072, 1075
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter General Media ]. GMC also claimed that the Act vio-
lated their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because the
ban affected only sexually explicit materials in magazines and video format. See id.
GMC further alleged that the vague wording of the statute infringed on their due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment. See id. GMC sought declaratory and
injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. See id.
For discussions of the First Amendment-Equal Protection intersection, see
Harry Kalven Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 29-30; William W. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitu-
tional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 337-39 (1963).
44. See General Media I, 952 F. Supp. at 1071, 1083. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that the Act banning sales and
rental of pornographic material was unconstitutional under the First, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See id.
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III. BACKGROUND
The General Media decision is best viewed by analyzing the two
conflicting constitutional doctrines involved: the doctrine of free
speech and the doctrine of deference to military judgment in mili-
tary matters. Although these concepts evolved through separate
lines of cases they converged in the Second Circuit's General Media
decision. Part A of this section discusses the doctrine of free
speech.45 Specifically, Part A observes that content-based speech re-
strictions have been analyzed based on the type of forum in which
speech occurs.46 Next, Part A distinguishes between content and
viewpoint discrimination.47 Part B examines viewpoint discrimina-
tion in the military forum. 48 Part B examines the general judicial
policy of deference to the military and reviews whether this defer-
ence will override the general prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination in the military forum.49
A. The Doctrine of Free Speech
1. Balancing Restrictions on Speech
In America, Communists may speak freely,50 the Klu Klux Klan
may promulgate its ideas51 and the Nazi party may march through a
city with a large Jewish population.5 2 The bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment is that the government may not pro-
scribe the expression of an idea simply because the idea is offensive
or disagreeable. 53 Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court an-
45. For a discussion of the doctrine of free speech, see infra notes 50-103 and
accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of how content-based restrictions on free speech are ana-
lyzed, see infra notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the distinction between content-based and viewpoint-
based restrictions, see infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of viewpoint discrimination in the military forum, see
infra notes 104-225 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion of the judicial policy of deference to the military and
whether this deference will override the general prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination in the military forum, see infra notes 105-225 and accompanying text.
50. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 494 (1951) (permitting teaching
of Communist ideology).
51. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444 (1969) (allowing Klu Klux
Klan right to express views).
52. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (permitting Nazi
party demonstration).
53. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 615, 655-63 (1991). Each individual should decide for themselves
which ideas and beliefs deserve expression by choosing among those available in
the free market of ideas. See id. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States, expounds the marketplace of ideas theory. See Abrams v. United
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nounced that "above all else the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' 54 The Court, neverthe-
less, has frequently upheld content-based restrictions on speech. 55
The Court has reconciled such holdings in two ways.
First, the Court has held that some speech is categorically ex-
cluded from protection under the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire,5 6 the Court announced that: "[t] here are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
constitutional problems."57 Thus, we do not ask whether particular
obscene publications are protected by the First Amendment.5 8 Ob-
scenity is not the kind of expression that the "freedom of speech"
intends to protect.59 Laws restricting the availability of obscenity
are therefore not restricted by the First Amendment.
60
States 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting). Holmes stated, "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can be safely
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Id. (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Holmes' marketplace of ideas theory rose from deep currents in Brit-
ish political thought. SeeJEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONsTrnITIONAL LAw: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 890-92 (1996). In the seventeenth century, John Milton
advocated the same laissez-faire clash of ideas propounded by Holmes in Abrams.
See id. (citing JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITIcA (1644)). The English political econo-
mist John Stuart Mill expressed similar ideas in the nineteenth century. See id.
(citingJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859)).
The viability of the marketplace of ideas theory has been criticized by several
commentators. See generally, C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964, 976 (1978);Jerome Barron, Access to the Press - A
New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. Rv. 1641, 1648 (1967); Herbert Marcuse,
Repressive Tolerance in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE Or PURE
ToEmRANcE 110 (1965); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 591, 617 (1982). Marcuse believes that the free discussion of ideas is so dis-
torted by economic reality that the dissenting idea or viewpoint does not really
have a fair chance: "Under the rule of monopolistic media - themselves the mere
instruments of economic and political power - a mentality is created from which
right and wrong, true and false are predefined whenever they effect the vital inter-
ests of society." Marcuse, supra, at 110.
54. Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
55. For a discussion of valid content-based restrictions, see infra notes 56-65
and accompanying text.
56. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
57. Id. at 571-72 (1942).
58. See BARRON, supra note 53, at 1653. "Unprotected areas include obscenity,
fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation, advocacy of imminent lawless behavior,
'fighting words' and child pornography." Id.
59. See id. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 747 (1982) (address-
ing restrictions on pornographic depictions of children); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 15 (1973) (addressing restrictions on obscene books and magazines).
60. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Miller test identifies material which may be
banned as obscenity. See id. To be deemed obscene, this test requires that:
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Second, the Court has upheld some content-based restrictions
under a "balancing" test.6 1 This balancing approach may be ex-
pressed as a formula as in the case of the clear and present danger
doctrine. 62 The balancing approach may also involve the courts
evaluation of content-based legislation and an examination of the
legislation's context and the government's purpose.63 This evalua-
tion usually requires the Court to weigh the government interest in
maintaining the regulation against the burden of the legislation on
free speech.64 Cases using the public forum concept reflect this
type of balancing. 65
In Pery Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Associa-
tion,66 the Court developed the conceptual framework for public
(1) the "'average person applying contemporary community standards' would find
that 'the work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;'" (2) the work
"depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law" and (3) the work, "taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
The Miller test's first prong is directly adopted from Roth v. United States. See id.
(citing Roth v. United States, 345 U.S. 476 (1957)). In Roth, the Court defined the
term "prurient" as "having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts" from the "average
person" whose attitudes reflect current community standards. See Roth, 345 U.S. at
487-89.
To qualify as obscene, material must satisfy all three prongs of the Miller test.
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Military Honor and Decency Act, challenged in
General Media, did not mention "community standards," "average person" or "lack-
ing serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." See 10 U.S.C. § 2489a(a)
(1997). Therefore, the Act restricted sexual materials that were not obscene
under Miller. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Had the Act solely restricted obscene
materials, the military could have lawfully prohibited these sales. See id.
61. See BARRON, supra note 53, at 993-94.
62. See id.
63. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974). The Lehman
Court stated that the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved
have remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded. See
id. In Lehman, the Court held that advertising card space on a city's mass transit
system was not a First Amendment forum, and that such advertising could be regu-
lated on the basis of content. See id. The Court suggested that the case presented
peculiar facts that differed greatly from the traditional settings where First Amend-
ment values inalterably prevailed. See id. In particular, the Court differentiated
Lehman on the basis that public bus passengers constituted a captive audience. See
id.
64. See id. at 303. The Lehman court relied on a Lord Dunedin quote to sup-
port the proposition that the nature of the forum and the competing interests
involved determine the degree of protection afforded speech. See id. In MAra v.
Magistrates of Edinburgh, Dunedin noted, "It] he truth is that open spaces and public
places differ very much in their character, and before you could say whether a
certain thing could be done in a certain place you would have to know the history
of the particular place." 1913 Session Case 1059, 1073-74.
65. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (developing public-forum analysis).
66. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
[Vol. 6: p. 127
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss1/6
VIEwPOINT DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY
forum analysis. 67 The Perry Court explained that governmental
property falls into one of three categories. 68 First, public streets,
parks and other places which "by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate" are considered
traditional public forums.69 The second category is the designated
public forum, "a place not traditionally open to assembly and de-
bate, but which the State has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity." 70 In both traditional and designated
forums that are fully open to the public, content-based regulations
of speech are permissible only if "narrowly drawn to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest."71 The third category of property is
the non-public forum, which consists of all remaining public prop-
erty.72 In a non-public forum, the Court will likely uphold content-
based regulations.73 The government need only prove that the reg-
ulation is reasonable and not an effort to suppress the activity be-
cause of the speaker's views.74 Justifying this relaxed standard, the
Perry Court explained that "the State, no less than a private owner
of property, has power to preserve property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."75
The categorical forum approach predetermines outcomes by
determining the standard of review.76 Consequently, classifying the
nature of the forum is extremely important. In classifying types of
67. See id. at 45.
68. See id. at 44-45 ("The existence of a right of access to public property and
the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ de-
pending on the character of the property at issue.").
69. See id. at 45.
70. Id. Although a state is not required to open a particular forum, once it
does, the constitution forbids arbitrary exclusion. See id. The state, however, is not
required to indefinitely retain the open character of the forum. See id.
71. Id. The same standards apply to "traditional public forums" and "desig-
nated forums." Id. In these forums, the government may not prohibit all speech.
See id. Content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compel-
ling state interest. See id.; see also Carey v. Brown, 477 U.S. 455, 463 (1980). The
state may also enforce regulations of the time, place and manner of expression
which "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave ample alternative channels of communication." Perny Educ.
Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 45.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 46 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)). The Court has explicitly stated that the "First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or
controlled by the government." Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Green-
burgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).
76. See Perry Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 45.
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forums, the Supreme Court examines the compatibility of the ex-
pressive activity with the normal use of the property.77 A narrower,
but increasingly dominant approach scrutinizes the government's
intent.78 Under this approach, the Court considers the compatibil-
ity of the expressive activity, the nature of the property and the rele-
vant policies of the government. 79 The Court ascertains whether
the government intended to designate the place a public forum.8 0
A state creates a non-public forum when it reserves property for
specific official uses.8 1
The Supreme Court has recognized that the military maintains
an installation to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum. 82
Accordingly, "[a] lmost without exception, courts have categorized
military bases as non-public forums."83
2. Distinguishing Between Content-Based and Viewpoint-Based
Restrictions
While the government is sometimes permitted to enact con-
tent-based restrictions on speech, it may never enact viewpoint-
based restrictions.8 4 Basically, the government may not decide that
77. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 385 U.S. 863, 863 (1966) (holding quiet sit-in
protest in public library is constitutionally protected).
78. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804
(1985).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1974) (upholding military regula-
tions banning speeches, demonstrations, and distribution of partisan political liter-
ature on military base).
83. Shopco Distrib. Co. v. Commanding Gen., 885 F.2d 167, 172 (4th Cir.
1989). Likewise, military exchanges located on military property are non-public
forums. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805. Military exchanges exist to provide "author-
ized patrons with articles and services necessary for their health, comfort, and con-
venience and [to provide] a supplemental source of funding for [military moral,
welfare, and recreational] programs." General Media Communications, Inc. v. Co-
hen, 131 F.3d 273, 280 (2d Cir. 1997). The exchanges are not public; in order to
purchase items, patrons must show military identification. See id. "Only military
personnel, their dependents, orphans, surviving spouses, and certain other affili-
ated personnel are admitted." Id. These limits suggest that the government did
not intend to create a public forum. Although military exchanges are "engaged in
commerce," they do not qualify as a traditional public forum. Cf Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (holding advertising space inside city bus
not traditional public forum).
84. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
393 (1993) (denying religious group access to school property because it planned
to discuss secular topic from religious perspective violated First Amendment); Cor-
nelius, 473 U.S. at 812 (stating that viewpoint restrictions are unacceptable even in
nonpublic forum where freedom of speech receives least protection); AIDS Action
Comm. of Mass., Inc., v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 3 (1994) (stat-
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some messages are superior to others.8 5 The Supreme Court has
indicated that the "government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wish-
ing to express less favored or more controversial views."86 Govern-
ment action that censors speech on the basis of viewpoint deprives
people of ideas and artistic experiences that could contribute to
their growth, skews public debate, retards democratic change and
constricts human liberty.8 7 Thus, constitutional prohibition against
"viewpoint discrimination," and the jurisprudential pursuit of its
converse, "viewpoint neutrality," arise from the most basic values
underlying the First Amendment.88
Understanding the importance of "viewpoint neutrality" is rela-
tively straightforward. It is, however, considerably more difficult to
define the concept or to understand its application in the myriad
contexts in which the government interacts with citizens.8 9 Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court has not clearly distinguished between
viewpoint discrimination and the more generic concept of content
discrimination. 90 The Court has, however, acknowledged that the
distinction is not precise. 91 As a concept, content encompasses en-
tire subjects of discourse regardless of the viewpoint expressed. 92
The Court's decision in Burson v. Freeman93 illustrates this distinc-
tion. In Burson, the Court examined a law banning political cam-
paigning within 100 feet of a polling place. 94 The Court deemed
the ban content-based because it prohibited an entire class of
ing "transportation authority's decision not to run AIDS committee's ads while
running ads for movie containing sexually explicit words and photographs" consti-
tuted impermissible viewpoint discrimination regardless of presence in non-public
forum).
85. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812.
86. Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
87. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black J., concurring)
("[Viewpoint regulation is] censorship in a most odious form .... "). See generally
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 99 (1996); Red-
ish, supra note 53, at 591; Williams, supra note 53, at 676-93 (contending First
Amendment values include pursuit of truth, democracy's proper functioning, ful-
fillment of human potential, self-expression, tolerance, and encouragement of
dissent).
88. See Heins, supra note 87, at 100.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. Of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
831 (1995).
92. For a discussion of the difference between content and viewpoint discrim-
ination, see infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
93. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
94. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 208.
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speech (all campaign speech), but viewpoint-neutral because it did
not ban particular political viewpoints. 95
The Supreme Court has indicated that whether a restriction is
content-based or viewpoint-based will depend on whether the re-
striction prohibits all viewpoints or whether the restriction favors
certain viewpoints by suppressing others. 96 The subject of political
speech provides a useful illustration of this point. Political speech,
as a whole, is considered a subject matter and not a viewpoint be-
cause there is no distinctive viewpoint of politics.9 7 The exclusion
of the whole category of political speech would impoverish debate,
but it would not skew debate because some political views would not
gain unfair advantage over others. 98 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has characterized the exclusion of political speech as con-
tent-based regulation. 99
In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that restrictions on
religious expression constitute viewpoint-based discrimination. 100
95. See id. at 198.
96. See Heins, supra note 87, at 121-22. Heins explains the viewpoint discrimi-
nation doctrine:
The Court has repeatedly recognized that controversial political view-
points are "the essence of First Amendment expression." The viewpoint
neutrality rule is designed precisely to protect this "essence" by prevent-
ing government suppression of controversial or otherwise disfavored
ideas. That purpose is ill-served, as the Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger
Courts recognized, if government may accomplish its goal by suppressing
an entire category of viewpoints-be they religious, "political," "contro-
versial," or "offensive." Speech that is controversial, that induces a condi-
tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger, is precisely the speech most in need of constitu-
tional protection. Rosenberger, which refused to permit government to
"skew" public debate by disadvantaging whole categories of ideas, com-
pels the conclusion that restrictions on speech deemed "political," "offen-
sive," or "controversial," must be understood as viewpoint based.
Id. (citations omitted).
Heins argued that courts must recognize discrimination against the alleged
"indecent" aspect of sexual speech as viewpoint-based discrimination. See id. at
169. She acknowledged, however, that this is a controversial proposition "because
the notion that sex is not an appropriate subject matter for public discussion and
display is so deeply ingrained in our society." Id.
97. See id. at 122.
98. See id.
99. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 788
(1985) (upholding exclusion of political speech from charity drive in federal work-
place); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 828 (1976) (upholding military's ban on
political speakers' entry onto base, although it allowed entry by non-political speak-
ers); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding municipal
transit system's ban against political advertisements on car cards, which allowed
array of other advertisements).
100. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 384 (1993).
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In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,10 1 a
school district prohibited a religious group from showing a reli-
gious film about child rearing and family values while allowing secu-
lar groups to show films on the same topic. 10 2 The Court held that
denying access to a speaker solely to suppress their point of view
skews debate and constitutes viewpoint discrimination.10 3
B. Viewpoint Discrimination in the Non-Public Military Forum
The Court unanimously agrees that the regulation of speech in
a non-public forum must be viewpoint neutral. 04 This Part ana-
lyzes the interaction between this flat prohibition on viewpoint dis-
crimination and the general policy of judicial deference to military
decision-making.
1. The Doctrine of Judicial Deference to the Military
Several reasons justify the traditional policy of deference to the
military, each of which is based on the unique importance of the
military's mission. 10 5 First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
101. See id.
102. See id. at 394.
103. See id. at 385.
104. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. For a discussion concerning the absolute
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination see The Content Distinction in Free
Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1904 (1989).
105. For a discussion of these reasons, see infra notes 106-11 and accompany-
ing text. As to the military's mission, the Supreme Court has stated "it is the pri-
mary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (quoting United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive
obedience, unity, commitment and esprit de corps."). The interest in maintaining
good order and discipline has few counterparts in the civilian community. See id.
One commentator explained:
The primary mission of the armed forces is to defend our national inter-
ests by preparing for, and, when necessary, waging war, using coercive
and lethal force. Responsibility for the awesome machinery of war re-
quires a degree of training, discipline, and unit cohesion that has no par-
allel in civilian society.
The armed forces must develop traits of character, patterns of behav-
ior, and standards of performance during peacetime in order to ensure
the effective application and control of force in combat. Members of the
armed forces are subject to disciplinary rules and military orders, twenty-
four hours a day, regardless of whether they are actually performing a
military duty.
Military service is a unique calling. It is more than ajob. Our nation
asks the men and women of the armed forces to make extraordinary sac-
rifices to provide for the common defense. While civilians remain secure
in their homes, with the broad freedom to live where and with whom they
choose, members of the armed forces may be assigned, involuntarily, to
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stated that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers man-
dates some form of deference.10 6 The Constitution expressly gives
Congress and the Executive power over military affairs.10 7
Although the Supreme Court has not completely renounced its
power of review over military affairs, the Court believes that the ple-
nary power given to the other branches should not be second
guessed by the judiciary.' 08 Second, the Supreme Court cites the
military's status as a separate community.' 0 9 Recognizing the mili-
tary's unique responsibility for national security, the Court has been
reluctant to interfere with the military's role in training and super-
vising its personnel. 110 The third reason for deference is based on
the limits ofjudicial competence concerning regulation of the mili-
tary establishment's highly specialized needs."'
A long line of Supreme Court cases have given virtually unlim-
ited deference to military decision-making when constitutional
rights conflict with claimed military necessity. 112 Several major
any place in the world, often on short notice, often to places of grave
danger, often in the most spartan and primitive conditions.
Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Courts Jurisprudence in Military
Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 557, 558 (1994).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section makes Congress responsible for
raising, maintaining and governing the military; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1 (making President Commander-in-Chief of military).
107. See id.
108. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
109. SeeParker, where the Court noted: "[t]his Court has long recognized that
the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We
have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and
traditions of its own during its long history." 417 U.S. at 743 (quoting Quarles, 350
U.S. at 17); see also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("[Tjhe military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of
the civilian.").
110. See Orloff, 345 U.S. at 94. In Orloff the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the "judiciary [should] be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army
matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters." Id. at
93. As a result, the military has developed its own "military law" enforced by
courts-martial. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 743 (citing Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 35
(1827)). Moreover, courts will "not overturn a [court-martial conviction] unless it
is clearly apparent that, in the face of a First Amendment claim, the military lacks a
legitimate interest in proscribing the defendant's conduct." Avrech v. Secretary of
the Navy, 520 F.2d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
111. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1981) (acknowledging
Court's lack of experience concerning military affairs). But see C. Thomas Dienes,
When The First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special Contexts", 56
U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 821 n.163 (1988) (noting oddity of Court's assertion that its
competence is limited by military complexities given complex, technical and non-
legal issues regularly considered).
112. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 675 (1985) (upholding nu-
clear protester's debarment from Air Force base open house); Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498, 498 (1975) (upholding gender-based statutory distinctions on
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cases have focused on First Amendment issues and the Supreme
Court has consistently deferred to military decision-making con-
cerning these matters.1 13
A chronological review of these cases starts with Feres v. United
States,"14 where the Supreme Court held that soldiers could not
maintain tort suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
against the military for injuries arising out of their military ser-
vice.' 15 As subsequent Supreme Court decisions have noted, this
decision is based upon the "peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of
such suits on discipline." 1 6 The Court reasoned that the inher-
ently dangerous character of the military mission presents grave
risks that would make FICA liability unreasonable.' 7 Moreover,
allowing such claims would deter military commanders from engag-
ing in hazardous activities despite their importance to military oper-
ations." 8 Accordingly, the Court held that claims which challenge
the absolute discretionary nature of personnel or administrative de-
cisions by individual officers are non-justiciable. 19
Three years later, the Court considered a claim challenging
the constitutionality of a regulation governing the military's con-
tenure for regular officers); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 665, 665 (1973) (declin-
ing to become involved in administration of Ohio National Guard in wake of Kent
State shootings); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 137 (1953) (declining to re-evalu-
ate evidence in habeas corpus case on constitutional issues already ruled upon by
general courts-martial).
113. See Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
114. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
115. See id. at 146. Even earlier than Feres was Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), where the Supreme Court deferred to military regulations placing
Japanese-Americans in internment camps during World War II. See generally Eu-
gene Rostow, TheJapanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). This
decision, however, has been heavily criticized and courts rarely cite Korematsu as
precedent. See id.
116. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); see also United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (agreeing that Feres result was based on relation-
ship of superior to subordinate).
117. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 148.
118. See id.
119. See id. A crucial distinction must be understood: constitutional violations
by superior officers are not actionable in civilian courts because such lawsuits
would discourage or deter military officers' decisions for fear of the personal legal
ramifications. See id. In contrast, the same concerns about command and author-
ity are not implicated by challenges that contest the constitutionality of military
regulations. See, e.g., Jorden v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 110 (1986)
(noting that when court instructs officer to stop applying regulation in arbitrary
manner, it poses less threat to vigorous decision-making than would imposing per-
sonal liability on officer).
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scription policies. 120 In Orloffv. Willoughby,121 a psychiatrist, Stanley
Orloff, was lawfully inducted into the Army Medical Corps under
the Doctor's Draft Act, but he was denied a commission because he
declined to admit whether he had been a member of the Commu-
nist Party.122 As a result, Orloff was refused physician privileges and
was employed as a medical technician instead. 123 Orloff claimed
that he suffered discrimination because the limited rank and duties
of a medical technician were not commensurate with those of a
commissioned psychiatrist. He requested physician privileges or, al-
ternatively, discharge from active duty.124 The Supreme Court de-
nied Orloffs requests in language that has been quoted repeatedly
in subsequent military cases to validate the application of a special
standard of deference. 25 Emphasizing that the military is a unique
entity with its own set of rules, the Court ruled that the military is
not subject to the same judicial criteria as civilian society.126 The
Orloff Court stated that the judiciary must not interfere in legiti-
mate military concerns, just as the armed forces must not interfere
with judicial matters. 127 Accordingly, the Court refused to review
Orloff's discrimination claims and ruled that the military has a spe-
cial right to control the actions of its members. 28
120. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
121. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
122. See id. at 89-90 (1955).
123. See id. at 88-89. Orloff was assigned to medical duties in the treatment of
patients within the psychiatric field. See id. at 93. He was not allowed to perform
functions that pertain to commissioned officers. See id. Specifically, Orloff was
restricted from administering certain psychoactive drugs and forbidden to practice
hypnotism on patients he did treat. See id. Orloff asked the Supreme Court to lift
the restrictions on his psychiatric practice on the argument that he would be free
to administer such treatments if he was in private practice. See id. The government
asserted that, for reasons of security, Orloff should remain prohibited from ad-
ministering drugs and hypnotism since his patients may be officers who possess
important military information which Orloff might draw out while they were under
the influence of his treatment. See id. at 89-90.
124. See id. at 86.
125. See id. at 94. Compare Orloff, 345 U.S. at 94 ("[T]he military constitutes
a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civil-
ian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to inter-
fere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to inter-
vene in judicial matters.") with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)
("[C]ourts must give great deference to the professional judgement of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.")
and Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) ("no military organization can
function without the strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in
a civilian setting.").
126. See Or/off 345 U.S. at 94.
127. See id.
128. See id. The Court refused to evaluate the discriminatory nature of Or-
loff s orders. See id. Concluding that discrimination is inherently unavoidable in
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The Supreme Court's next decision, Frontiero v. Richardson,129
helped define the parameters of military deference. In contrast to
Orloff Fronterio shows that judicial deference is not absolute. Fron-
tiero involved a challenged administrative policy which required wo-
men in the military to produce evidence that their husbands were
dependent on them before the military would grant spousal bene-
fits, although the military allowed males to automatically claim their
wives as dependants deserving spousal benefits.130 The Court never
mentioned the policy of deference in its opinion, suggesting that it
"did not feel the congressionally legislated administrative proce-
dure for receiving benefits constituted a 'core military function'
worthy of deference."131 Thus, Frontiero indicates that the policy of
deference is not absolute. Courts will not apply such deference
without first finding a satisfactory nexus between the challenged ac-
tion and military necessity.1 32
In Parker v. Levy,' 33 the next case to address military deference,
a conscripted physician refused to train special service forces per-
sonnel and publicly urged black enlisted personnel to refuse to
serve in Vietnam.134 Levy was convicted under the general articles
set forth in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.)13 5 of
the Army, the Court illustrated its conclusion with the example that "some soldiers
are assigned dangerous missions while others find soft spots." Id.
129. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
130. See id.
131. John Nelson Ohlweiler, The Principle of Deference: Facial Constitutional Chal-
lenges to Military Regulations, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 147, 162 (1993).
132. See id.
133. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
134. See id. at 738. Dr. Levy's statements, according to the Article 134 specifi-
cation, suggested:
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I
would refuse to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any
colored soldier would go to Viet Nam; they should refuse to go to Viet
Nam and if sent should refuse to fight because they are discriminated
against and denied their freedom in the United States, and they are sacri-
ficed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all hazardous
duty and they are suffering the majority of the casualties.
Id. at 738 n.5.
135. See id. at 737-38. Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. § 933, provides: "any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct." Id. Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, 10 U.S.C. § 934, provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and ne-
glects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,
all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and
crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter
may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or sum-
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"conduct unbecoming an officer" and conduct prejudicial "to good
order and discipline."1 3 6 Levy challenged the general articles as un-
constitutionally vague and overly broad. 13 7 Based on the military
context, Justice Rehnquist determined that the appropriate stan-
dard for reviewing vagueness claims against the articles of the
U.C.M.J. was the reasonale knowledge standard.138 In reviewing
Levy's overbreadth challenge, the Court required "substantial over-
breadth."13 9 While the Court concluded that the different charac-
ter of military society requires a different application of the First
Amendment and related doctrines, the Court failed to articulate a
clear standard of review. 140
In the following year, however, the Court further defined
its evolving principle of deference.1 41  In Schlesinger v. Bal-
mary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense,
and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
Id.
136. Id. at 738.
137. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 755-57.
138. See id. at 756. Thus, if the defendant could have reasonably known that
his action was criminal under the U.C.M.J., he is responsible for the criminal con-
sequences of his actions. See id. at 757.
139. Id. at 755-57. The Court acknowledged that the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice regulates a far broader range of the conduct of military personnel than
a typical state criminal code regulates the conduct of civilians. See id. at 750.
Nonetheless, the Court held that Articles 133 and 134 were not overly vague or
broad. See id. at 756-78. The Court concluded that Levy had fair notice from the
language in each article that his conduct was punishable. See id. at 755. The Court
cited Broadrick v. Oklahoma for its proposition that where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, the "overbreadth must 'not only be real, but substantial
as well.'" Id. at 760 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 602, 615 (1973)).
140. While the Parker Court engaged in military deference, it illustrated that it
would first consider Levy's challenge on the merits and require the showing of
some relationship between the challenged rule and the core military function as-
serted. See Ohlweiler, supra note 131, at 161. Despite the Court's attempt to ex-
plain a coherent principle of deference, however, "its professed standard of review
of constitutional claims was not much clearer than it was in Orloff" Id.
141. In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975). For a discussion of Ballard, see infta notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
In the same year, the Court also decided, Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975). Councilman involved a prejudgment collateral attack on court-martial pro-
ceedings. See Councilman, 420 U.S. at 742. Army Captain Councilman was charged
with off-base possession and distribution of marijuana. See id. at 743. Following
arraignment, the local United States District Court enjoined the proceedings on
the basis that these off-base activities were not "service-related" and, thus, not
within the jurisdiction of the court martial. See id. at 747. The Supreme Court
vacated the injunction and, echoing Parker v. Levy, held that the military can re-
quire a respect for duty and discipline without counterpart in civilian life. See id. at
756. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Uniform Code of Military Justice
represented a legitimate attempt by Congress to balance military necessities
against fairness to service members. See id. at 757-58. Compare Councilman, 420 U.S.
at 757-58 (imposing court-martial conviction after finding incident was "service-
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lad,142 the Court examined an equal protection challenge to 10
U.S.C. § 6382(a), which required male officers to be discharged af-
ter nine years of service if they were passed over twice for promo-
tion and 10 U.S.C. § 6401(a), which gives women thirteen years of
service before mandatory discharge for twice failing to be pro-
moted. 143 The Court distinguished the case from Fronterio, finding
a more direct relationship between the regulations and the asserted
military interest of establishing military leadership.144 After finding
this nexus between the asserted military interests and the enacted
regulation, the Court applied its still-undefined deference princi-
ple.145 The Court used a rational relation test to uphold the regula-
tion in question.1 4 6
In the next three related cases, the Supreme Court examined
the impact of military deference on the First Amendment. In Greer
v. Spock,147 the Court examined a civilian's ability to exercise First
Amendment rights in a military context.1 48 The later companion
cases, Brown v. Glines149 and Navy v. Huff 150 dealt with the exercise
of free speech in the military by service members.1 5 ' In Spock, civil-
ians intending to stage a political rally were denied admission to
a military base. 152 Local base regulations banned political speeches
and demonstrations and the distribution of literature without prior
approval of local commanders.153 Under these regulations, a com-
related") with O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 258 (1969) (vacating court-mar-
tial conviction for off-base assault and attempted rape due to lack of service con-
nection) and Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
(limiting exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians connected with armed
forces who commit offenses overseas).
142. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
143. See id. at 501.
144. See id. at 510. The Court distinguished Ballard from Fronterio
In ... Frontiero the reason asserted to justify the challenged gender-based
classification was administrative convenience, and that alone. Here, on
the contrary, the operation of the statutes in question results in a flow of
promotions commensurate with the Navy's current needs and serves to
motivate qualified commissioned officers to so conduct themselves that
they may realistically look forward to higher levels of command.
Id. For a discussion of the facts in Fronterio, see supra notes 129-32 and accompany-
ing text.
145. See Ohlweiler, supra note 131, at 162.
146. See id.
147. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
148. See id. at 831-34.
149. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
150. 444 U.S. 453 (1980).
151. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 349-53.
152. See Spock, 424 U.S. at 832.
153. See id. at 831. (quoting Fort Dix Reg. 210-27 (1970); Fort Dix Reg. 210-26
(1968)). Fort Dix Regulation 210-26 prohibits political speeches and similar activi-
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mander had authority to bar literature or speeches tending to con-
stitute a "clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops
on the base.' 54 The Court held that the regulations did not violate
the First Amendment. 155 Although the Court stated that a com-
mander's prohibition might be struck down if the regulations were
"applied irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily," the majority did
not specify what would constitute an unconstitutional application of
the regulations. 156 The activists argued that the military base was
open to the public in certain areas and there was no basis for selec-
tively closing it to political candidates and distributors of unap-
proved literature. 157 The Supreme Court determined that the right
of public access had not converted the base into a public forum for
First Amendment purposes because it is the "business of a military
installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers and not to provide a pub-
lic forum." 15 8 The Court deferred to military interests and regula-
ties on the military reservation. See id. Fort Dix Regulation 210-27 prohibits the
distribution of literature without prior approval of headquarters. See id. Regula-
tion 210-27 provides that "[t] he distribution or posting of any publication, includ-
ing newspapers, magazines, handbills, flyers, circulars, pamphlets or other
writings, issued, published or otherwise prepared by any person, persons, agency
or agencies . . . is prohibited on the Fort Dix Military Reservation without prior
approval of ... headquarters." Id. This regulation was issued in conformity with
Army Regulation 210-10, P5-5(c) (1970), which states that permission to distribute
a publication may be withheld only where "it appears that the dissemination of
[the] publication presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or moral of
troops at [the] installation ... ." Spock, 424 U.S. at 831.
Because this procedure subjects literature to a content-based review, the effect
of the regulation would be to bar radical campaign literature, while permitting the
distribution of conventional political literature. Such a result raises the specter of
viewpoint regulation.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 830. Fort Dix regulations mandated: "[C]ivilian vehicular traffic
is permitted on paved roads within the reservation and civilian pedestrian traffic is
permitted on both roads and foot paths .... The main entrances to Fort Dix are
not normally guarded .... Civilians are freely permitted to visit unrestricted areas
of the base." Id. In the past, civilian speakers were invited to speak at Fort Dix. See
id. The subjects of their talks ranged from drug abuse to business management.
See id. Clergymen were also invited to perform religious services in the chapel on
base. See id.
158. Id. at 837-38. The Court asserted that "a necessary concomitant of the
basic function of a military installation has been 'the historically unquestioned
power.., to exclude civilians ....'" Id. at 838. The Court rejected the notion that
federal military reservations have traditionally served as a place for free public as-
sembly and communication. See id. The Court explained in a footnote:
The fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes
been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not of itself serve to covert Fort Dix
into a public forum or to confer upon political candidates a First or Fifth
Amendment right to conduct their campaigns there. The decision of the
military authorities that a civilian lecture on drug abuse, a religious ser-
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tions that were usually deemed unconstitutional, such as inhibiting
free speech, were permissible in the military context.159
The Supreme Court elaborated this point in the companion
cases of Brown v. Glines160 and Navy v. Huf/'61 which arose, respec-
tively, from situations in the Air Force and Marine Corps. Both
branches of the service required members to obtain advance ap-
proval from base commanders before circulating petitions on
base.1 62 In both cases, the Court rejected the claim that the regula-
tions were an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The
Brown Court relied on Spock where it found constitutional a similar
regulation that allowed a commander to determine whether partic-
ular materials posed a clear danger to his troops.163 The Court con-
firmed that it had "long ago recognized that the military must
vice by a visiting preacher at the base chapel, or a rock musical concert
would be supportive of the military mission at Fort Dix surely did not
leave the authorities powerless thereafter to prevent any civilian from en-
tering Fort Dix to speak on any subject whatever.
Id.
159. See Spock, 424 U.S. at 836. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there
was no constitutional right to make speeches or to distribute literature at Fort Dix.
See id.
160. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
161. 444 U.S. 453 (1980).
162. See id. at 455-56; Brown, 444 U.S. at 349-50. In Brown, the Court ex-
amined the validity of an Air Force regulation requiring personnel to obtain prior
approval before soliciting signatures on grievance petitions. See id. at 348. Air
Force Regulations permit personnel to petition Members of Congress and other
public officials. See id. at 349. All solicitations, however, must first be authorized
by the commander. Id. at 350 n.1 (citing Air Force Reg. 30-1(9) (1971)). The
Regulations require approval for the distribution of "any printed or written mate-
rial other than publications of an official governmental agency." See id. at 350 n.2
(citing Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a) (1970)). The Regulations specify: "[w]hen
prior approval for distribution or posting is required, the commander will deter-
mine if a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the members of the
Armed Forces, or a material interference with the accomplishment of a military
mission would result." Id. at 350 n.2 (citing Air Force Reg. 35-15(3) (a) (2) (1970)).
163. See id. at 353 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976)). The
Supreme Court cited Spock for the proposition that "nothing in the Constitution
... disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a
clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or moral of troops on the base under his
command." Id. (quoting Spock, 424 at 840). The Brown Court suggested that it was
unpersuaded by an attempt to distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in
that case were civilians who had no specific right to enter a military base. See id. at
358 n.13. In Spock, the Court rejected a facial challenge to a regulation that re-
quired "any person," civilian or military, to obtain prior permission for the distri-
bution of literature on a base. See Spock, 424 U.S. at 831. The Brown Court
reasoned that "[u ] nauthorized distributions of literature by military personnel are
just as likely to undermine discipline and morale as similar distributions by civil-
ians." Brown, 444 U.S. at 358 n.13. Furthermore, the Court noted that the military
has greater authority over military personnel than civilians. See id.
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possess substantial discretion over its internal discipline." 164 In up-
holding the regulations, the Court remained unclear regarding the
standard of deference. 165 It appears that the Court reviewed the
merits, balanced each party's competing interests and concluded
that the regulations "protect[ed] a substantial governmental inter-
est" unrelated to the suppression of free expression and did not
restrict speech any more than was reasonably necessary to protect
the military's interests. 16 6
One year later, in Rostker v. Goldberg,167 the Supreme Court re-
turned to its policy of complete deference to the military and re-
fused to engage in substantive interest balancing.168 In Rostker, the
Supreme Court evaluated an equal protection claim challenging
the constitutionality of the Military Selective Service Act, which re-
quired only males to register for the draft. 69 The Court dismissed
the claim and noted that judicial deference is at its apogee when
reviewing Congress' chosen means for regulating the military. 17°
In Goldman v. Weinberger,171 a more recent case involving defer-
ence, the Court continued its retreat toward complete deference
with no substantive interest balancing. 72 In Goldman, the Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to an Air Force regulation arising under
the "free exercise" clause of the First Amendment. 173 At issue was
whether an active-duty Air Force Captain had a right under the First
Amendment to wear a yarmulke, a skullcap prescribed by the Or-
164. Id. at 357. The Court cited Orloff Levy, and Coucilman for this proposi-
tion. See id.
165. See Ohlweiler, supra note 131, at 163.
166. See Huff 444 U.S. at 458; Brown, 444 U.S. at 355. One observer noted
that the Brown Court confirmed an emerging body of case law that "sets the mili-
tary apart" with regard to constitutional protection of First Amendment rights. See
Levin, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that if speech in military were subjected to
civilian standards, there would be adverse impact on combat readiness).
167. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
168. See id. at 70. "U]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative
action under Congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules
and regulations for their governance is challenged." Id.
169. See id. at 76-78.
170. See id. at 70. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the claim, holding that
the decision to limit registration to men resulted from a considered determination
by Congress that restrictions on the use of women in combat made it pointless to
require their registration. See id. at 76-78.
171. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
172. See id. at 509.
173. See id. The First Amendment provides, in part, that: "Congress shall
make no law effecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Goldman asserted that the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment requires the Air Force to make an exception to its
uniform dress requirements for religious apparel. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509.
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thodox Jewish faith, despite an Air Force regulation prohibiting
headgear while indoors. 174 In upholding the regulation, Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion quoted deferential language from
previous cases and applied a standard of extreme deference to mili-
tary judgment. 175 The Court did not require an express nexus be-
tween the challenged regulation and the military's interest.176
Instead, the Court accepted carte blanche the military's assertion
that the dress regulation promoted uniformity necessary for mili-
tary efficiency.1 77 Significantly, although the Goldman majority sup-
ported the outcome, a plurality of that majority did not rely
exclusively on Rehnquist's extremely deferential language.1 7 8 In-
stead, they required some articulated relationship between the reg-
ulation and the military's asserted interest in efficiency.1 79
174. See id. at 505 (citing Air Force Reg. 35-10, para. 1-6.h(2)(f) (1980)).
"Headgear will not be worn... [wihile indoors except by armed security police in
the performance of their duties." Id.
175. See id. at 509. The Court stated, "[t] he desirability of dress regulations in
the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no
constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgement." Id.
The Goldman Court cited language from previous cases to support the proposition
that the judiciary should not interfere with military matters. See id. The Court
stated, " [t] he military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
"[W]e have repeatedly held that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from the civilian society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). "The
essence of military service is the subordination of the desires and interests of the
individual to the needs of the service." Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92
(1955).
176. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516 (Brnen,J., dissenting). "When a military
service burdens the free exercise rights of its members in the name of necessity, it
must provide, as an initial matter and at a minimum, a credible explanation of how
the contested practice is likely to interfere with the proffered military interest." Id.
177. See id. at 509. The Court deferred to the considered professional military
judgment of the Air Force in the "traditional outfitting of personnel in standard-
ized uniforms," as set forth in its regulations, which encourages subordination of
personal interests to those of the group and encourages "hierarchical unity" by
eliminating individual distinctions other than differences in rank. See id.
178. See id. at 513. (Justices Stevens, White and Powell concurred with Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion).
179. See id. at 510-13 (Stevens,J., concurring). Although Stevens never articu-
lated a clear standard of review, he suggested that a "reasonableness" relationship
between the regulation and the military's interests in sustaining discipline, uni-
formity and obedience is necessary. See id.; see also Seth Harris, Note, Permitting
Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military Deference, and the Exclusion of Lesbians and
Gay Men From the Militay, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 171, 216-17 (1989)
(suggesting that Stevens' dissent in Goldman, which articulated reasonable relation-
ship, "could perhaps be analogized to the 'substantial' relationship standard in-
ferred from Parker, Chappell and Rostker.").
Justice O'Connor was openly critical of the Court's failure to require proof of
a reasonable relationship between the regulation and the military's interests. See
Goldman, 475 U.S. at 528-33. She charged the Court with failing to weigh
Goldman's interest in Free Exercise against the military's interest in uniformity in
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From these decisions, it appears that the Court has established
a deferential review of challenges to military regulations. Although
the Court considered some degree of substantive interest balanc-
ing, recent decisions suggest that this practice has diminished. The
Goldman case highlights the Court's willingness to defer to military
interests. Nonetheless, Goldman's strong concurring and dissenting
opinions signal that the Court will likely still require a "reasonable
relationship" between a challenged military regulation and the mili-
tary's interests.'8 0
2. Balancing Military Deference with the Prohibition Against Viewpoint
Discrimination in the Non-Public Forum
The doctrinal rule that appears to have the Justices' universal
approval is that the regulation of speech in a non-public forum
must be "viewpoint neutral."' 18 On the other hand, the policy of
deference to military decision-making has often sanctioned other-
wise unconstitutional regulations.18 2 This leaves the question open
as to which doctrine prevails in the event of a conflict. The answer
revolves around understanding that (1) the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination in the non-public forum is not absolute;
(2) sometimes courts recognize viewpoint discrimination as a regu-
lar and unavoidable aspect of the internal management of speech
in the non-public forum; and (3) military deference may not always
justify allowing viewpoint discrimination.
a. When Viewpoint Discrimination is Permissible in the Non-
Public Forum
Viewpoint discrimination is often an unavoidable aspect of the
internal management of non-public forum speech. 183 Conse-
quently, imposing an absolute ban on viewpoint discrimination
dress. See id. at 530. Furthermore, her opinion is the only one that clearly articu-
lates a standard of review for a Free Exercise claim: first, when government at-
tempts to deny a Free Exercise claim, it must show that an unusually important
interest is at stake; second, the government must show that granting the requested
exemption will do substantial harm to that interest. See id.
180. See id. at 510-33.
181. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
182. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (preventing military personnel from
freely exercising religion); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding prior
restraint on speech for military personnel); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)
(rejecting vagueness and overbreadth claims in military context and punishing
otherwise protected political speech).
183. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1713, 1825 (1987).
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would bring government organizations to a halt.18 4 For example,
when a bureaucratic official commands a subordinate to present
Topic A at a staff meeting rather than Topic B, this is viewpoint
discrimination. 8 5 Similarly, when a military officer commands his
staff to draft a defense plan relying on strategic rather than conven-
tional weaponry, he engages in viewpoint discrimination. 8 6 None-
theless, such actions are permitted.
This result conflicts with the public forum analysis set forth in
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association, which
flatly prohibits viewpoint discrimination in the non-public fo-
rum. 187 A contradiction arises because the Perry analysis is not
meant to apply to the regulation of "internal speech" within an or-
ganization.'l 8  Rather, the Perry analysis applies when an organiza-
tion in a non-public forum discriminates on viewpoint among
outsiders who are invited to use the forum.18 9 Consequently, the
Perry analysis has been difficult to reconcile with non-public forum
cases which involve a mixture of internal speech and public speech
within a non-public forum.1 90 Courts often ignore Perry and permit
viewpoint discrimination. 191
This point is illustrated in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor
Union,192 in which a non-public forum prison extended access to
outside organizations (for example, the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anony-
mous, and the Boy Scouts). 1 9 3 Prison wardens stated that such or-
ganizations served "a rehabilitative purpose, working in harmony
with the goals and desires of the prison administrators .... ,"94 The
Supreme Court approved the prison policy and ignored viewpoint
discrimination issues.' 95 Apparently, the Court was persuaded that
these outside speakers provided speech similar to the internal
speech necessary for the proper function of the prison.' 96 The
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(developing forum analysis).
188. See id,
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977).
191. See id. at 135.
192. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
193. See id. at 133.
194. Id. at 134.
195. See id. at 135.
196. One commentator has suggested that "if the Court were serious about
imposing a ban on viewpoint discrimination .. .the services and expertise of Al-
1999]
29
Simpson: Viewpoint Discrimination in the Military Context: Defining the Di
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
156 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JoURNAL
Court, however, never suggested that prison wardens can engage in
arbitrary viewpoint discrimination. For example, one commentator
has argued that the wardens could not permit Baptists to address
inmates, but exclude Methodists. 197 Therefore, viewpoint discrimi-
nation is prohibited when an institution permits selective access to
members of the public for reasons other than achieving legitimate
institutional ends.
This analysis is complicated, however, by the difficult determi-
nation of when "outside speech" becomes internal speech.1 98 The
Supreme Court has not established clear parameters or rules to dis-
tinguish outside and internal speech. 199 One scholar accepted the
challenge and attempted to define the differing forms of speech. 200
He uses a hypothetical supposing:
... prison officials permit a citizens' group supporting an
initiative to issue bonds for the construction of new prison
facilities access to prison facilities for news conferences
and so forth, but deny such access to citizens' groups op-
posing the initiative. It is clear in the example that offi-
cials are engaging in viewpoint discrimination to serve the
institutional purpose of building better prison facilities,
and that this is a legitimate institutional objective. Yet we
would nevertheless condemn the discrimination. The rea-
son, I think, is that the citizen's groups have not been in-
corporated into the organizational domain of the prison
and endowed with specifically organizational roles, so that
the regulation of their speech is not analogous to the in-
ternal management of speech. Unlike Alcoholics Anony-
coholics Anonymous could be obtained only at the price of granting equal access
to groups promoting drunkenness or drug abuse." See Post, supra note 183, at 1826.
Obviously, such a result would completely frustrate the prison's policies.
197. See id. at 1827.
198. See id. "The pertinent inquiry then concerns the question of when mem-
bers of the general public have assumed quasi-organizational status so that the
regulation of their speech is 'like' the internal management of speech." Id. at
1828.
199. See id. The Court has often accorded members of the general public
quasi-organizational status so that their speech can be regulated on viewpoint like
internal speech. See id. For example, in Greer v. Spock, the challenged regulations
state that permission to distribute a publication may be withheld only where "it
appears that the dissemination of the publication presents a clear danger to the
loyalty, discipline, or moral of troops... ." 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976). This regula-
tion effectively censored speech on the basis of content and viewpoint. See id. at
869 n.16. The Court chose to ignore this consequence, however, by considering
the boosting of morale to be an internal management function that could be regu-
lated on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 869-70.
200. See Post, supra note 183, at 1828.
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mous in Jones, the citizens' groups are not performing
internal management functions that prison officials them-
selves could perform .... 201
The prohibition against viewpoint discrimination depends on
the relationship between members of the public and the internal
functioning of the institution.20 2 When members of the public are
performing specifically organizational roles, viewpoint discrimina-
tion is permitted.20 3 In contrast, if members of the public are in-
vited to speak for purposes that are not intrinsic to institutional
functioning, then viewpoint discrimination is prohibited. 20 4 Un-
derlying this distinction is the notion that viewpoint discrimination
is permissible when it is sufficiently similar to the internal manage-
ment of speech.20 5
b. Military Deference May Not Always Justify Viewpoint
Discrimination
An important and unresolved question is whether the policy of
military deference negates the prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination. Commentators suggest that this question involves two
inquiries: (1) whether courts should defer to military officials to
determine if members of the general public have attained quasi-
organizational status, and (2) whether courts should defer to mili-
tary officials who assert that viewpoint discrimination is needed to
attain institutional ends. 20 6
The first inquiry considers whether courts should defer to mili-
tary officials in determining whether the public has attained quasi-
organizational status. 207 Commentators suggest that courts, rather
than the military, should determine this first inquiry since the de-
termination of the quasi-organizational status of members of the
general public is fundamentally a legal characterization. 20 8
The second inquiry addresses whether the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination should override the policy of military def-
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See Post, supra note 183, at 1828.
206. See id. at 1829. Post's analysis refers to "warranted deference" in general.
See id. That he does not specifically examine military deference is not fatal to this
note's analysis however.
207. For a discussion of the courts deference to military officials regarding
quasi-organizational status, see infra note 208 and accompanying text.
208. See Post, supra note 183, at 1829.
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erence.20 9 In the past, courts have sustained regulations of speech
in the military, and indeed criminal convictions, based largely upon
the viewpoint of speech.210 In Parker v. Levy, the Court upheld a
court-martial conviction of an Army officer who urged black
soldiers to refuse to fight in Vietnam based on his belief that it was a
racist war.211 The Parker Court reasoned that Levy's views "urg[ed]
Negro enlisted men not to go to Vietnam if ordered to do so" and
that Levy's speech was punishable under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice for conduct "to the prejudice of good order and disci-
pline."2 1 2 Other cases have also upheld military regulations that
discriminated based on viewpoint. For example, in Greer v. Spock,
the Court upheld a regulation that imposed a prior restraint on all
political campaign literature by requiring a military commander to
approve the literature before distribution.2 13 The Fort Dix regula-
tion stated that the only publications that a military commander
may disapprove are those found to constitute "a clear danger to
[military] loyalty, discipline, or morale."2 1 4 The commanding of-
ficer of Fort Dix testified that civilian visitors could speak to soldiers
if the content of their proposed speech furthered the "military mis-
sion."2 15 The Court overlooked this viewpoint discrimination "evi-
dently because it considered the boosting of military morale to be
an internal management function."2 16
One final case, although not involving the military forum, best
illustrates these points by analogy. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Education Fund,217 the Court held that the Combined Fed-
eral Campaign (CFC), an annual charitable fund-raising drive
conducted in the federal workplace, was a non-public forum, and
that legal defense and political advocacy organizations could not be
excluded from the CFC because of their controversial natures. 218
209. For a discussion of whether the prohibition against viewpoint discrimina-
tion should override military deference, see infra notes 210-25 and accompanying
text.
210. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
211. See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). For a discussion of
Parker, see supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
212. Parker, 417 U.S. at 757.
213. See generally Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). For a discussion of
Spock, see supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
214. Spock, 424 U.S. at 840.
215. Id. at 868 n.16 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
216. Post, supra note 183, at 1828.
217. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
218. See id. at 811-12. The CFC is an annual charitable fund-raising drive con-
ducted in the federal workplace. See id. at 790. Participating organizations must
confine their fund-raising activities to a thirty-word statement which is included on
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The government argued that exclusion was necessary because their
participation jeopardized the success of the campaign and created
controversy among federal employees during the campaign. 219 The
Court understood that a certain degree of deference was warranted
regarding managerial decisions concerning the use of the CFC.22 0
Nevertheless, the Court held that the viewpoint discrimination was
impermissible.22 1 The Court reasoned that the CFC was not closely
related to the attainment of any specific organizational objectives;
rather, it was a means of affecting the surrounding environment in
ways unrelated to any particular organizational mission.2 22 There-
fore, the Court believed that the CFC did not fulfill a role that was
the campaign literature and pledge cards. See id. at 791. Volunteer federal em-
ployees distribute the campaign literature to their co-workers along with pledge
cards. See id. Contributions can take the form of a pay-roll deduction or a lump-
sum payment. See id. The CFC collects over $100 million in charitable contribu-
tions each year. See id. at 791.
The excluded groups included the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc., the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the Federally Employed Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund, the Indian Law Resources Defense Center, the Lawyers' Commit-
tee for Civil Rights under Law, and the Natural Resources Defense Council. See id.
at 793. Each of these organizations attempts to influence public policy through
one or more of the following means: political activity, advocacy, lobbying, or litiga-
tion on behalf of others. See id.
219. See id. at 807-09. The Government asserted that the purpose of the CFC
is to provide an opportunity for traditional health and welfare charities to solicit
contributions, while at the same time maximizing private support of these charities
which in turn reduces the cost to the Federal Government. See id. at 806. The
Government contended that the participation of legal defense and political advo-
cacy organizations hindered the success of the CFC campaign because they were
not viewed as worthwhile as traditional health and welfare charities. See id. at 807.
Furthermore, the Government contended that because the CFC campaign is con-
ducted during working hours, any controversy surrounding the participating orga-
nizations will produce unwelcome disruption of the work environment. See id.
The record adequately supported the Government's position that including
legal defense and political groups would hinder the campaign and disrupt the
workplace:
[The Office of Personnel Management] submitted a number of letters
from federal employees and managers, as well as from Chairmen of Local
Federal Coordinating Committees and Members of Congress expressing
concern about the inclusion of groups termed 'political' or 'nontradi-
tional' in the CFC. More than 80 percent of this correspondence related
requests that the CFC be restricted to 'non-political,' 'non-advocacy,' or
'traditional' charitable organizations.
Id.
220. See id. at 808-09 (stating that Government's decision to restrict access to
non-public forum need only be reasonable). "Here, the President could reason-
ably conclude that a dollar directly spent on providing food or shelter to the needy
is more beneficial than a dollar spent on litigation that might or might not result
in aid to the needy." Id. at 789.
221. See id.
222. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 795. The Court stated that "[t]he CFC was
designed to lessen the Government's burden in meeting human health and wel-
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intrinsic to the organizational mission of any particular government
organization. 22 3 Thus, the CFC functioned similarly to the citizens'
groups advocating prison bonds, in that both were independent of
any specific institutional function. Therefore, their activities could
not be regulated based on viewpoint like the internal management
of speech.2 24 The Court, however, did not invoke the prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination, but rather, remanded the case to
decide if viewpoint discrimination in fact existed. 225
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Forum Analysis
In General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district
court's decision for abuse of discretion. 226 The court commenced
its analysis by stating that when evaluating regulations on speech in
a particular forum, a court must first determine whether the forum
is public or non-public. 227 In evaluating content-based regulations,
the court stated that a "strict scrutiny" standard must be used to
determine whether the First Amendment has been violated if the
forum is public, and the less strict "reasonableness" standard must
be used if the forum is non-public. 228 The court then relied on
established precedent and concluded that military bases are non-
public forums.229
fare needs by providing a convenient, nondisruptive channel for federal employees
to contribute to nonpartisan agencies that directly serve those needs." Id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 278. Such an abuse "can be found if the
district court relied upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact or incorrectly applied
the law." Id.
227. See id.
228. See id.; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983). For a discussion of the differing standards of review involved in public
forum analysis, see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
229. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 280. "Almost without exception, courts
have concluded that military bases fall into the non-public forum category."
Shopco Distrib. Co. v. Commanding Gen., 885 F.2d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1989); see
also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). Military property becomes public in character
only when the government intentionally abandons "any right to exclude civilian
traffic and any claim of special interest in regulating expression." United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985). Accordingly, governmental intent should
be the touchstone of forum analysis. See Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65,
69 (2d Cir. 1991).
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2. Content & Viewpoint Discrimination Analysis
Next, the court addressed whether the Act constituted content-
based discrimination or viewpoint discrimination. 230 The court
noted that the government may reasonably restrict expressive ac-
tivity in a non-public forum on the basis of content, as long as the
restriction is not "an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due
to disagreement with the speaker's view."231 The court suggested
that if the Act discriminated on viewpoint, it would be subject to
"much more exacting constitutional scrutiny."232 The court ac-
knowledged, however, that the distinction between restrictions on
content and viewpoint is not precise.233
The court next examined the Act's provision that "prohibits
the sale or rental of recordings and periodicals the dominant
theme of which depicts or describes nudity, including sexual or ex-
cretory activities or organs, in a lascivious way."23 4 The court re-
jected GMC's argument that this construction targets a viewpoint of
"lasciviousness." 23 5 The court declined to find that"lasciviousness"
was a "specific premise" or "standpoint from which a variety of sub-
jects [could] be discussed and considered. '236 The court reasoned
that it would be impossible to discuss and consider political issues
from a lascivious viewpoint.23 7 Instead, the court interpreted "las-
civious" as specifying the subject matter (ie., content) that the Act
encompasses. 23 8 Therefore, the court concluded that the Act
banned not only depictions of nudity including sexual or excretory
activities or organs, but also depictions that are lascivious. 239 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the Act did not discriminate on
viewpoint. 24 0
230. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 280.
231. Id.; see also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992).
232. General Media, 131 F.3d at 281. In Perry Educ. Ass'n., the Court held that
even in a non-public forum, the government may not regulate speech in "an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."
460 U.S. at 46.
233. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. Of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
831 (1995).
234. General Media, 131 F.3d at 281.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 282.
238. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 282.
239. See id.
240. See id.
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3. "Reasonableness" Analysis
After concluding that the Act was based on content rather than
viewpoint, the court determined that the Act reasonably restricted
expressive activity in light of the purpose of the military forum.241
The court cited Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educucation
Fund,2 42 for the proposition that a restriction in a non-public forum
"need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation."243 The General Media court considered
the government's legitimate interest in regulating the military con-
text.244 The government argued that military honor, professional-
ism, and decorum would be adversely affected by the military-
sponsored sale of sexually explicit materials.2 45 The General Media
court accepted the government's argument that the Act is a reason-
able attempt to protect the military's image and core values. 246 The
court was unpersuaded by GMC's argument that the Act is defective
because it failed to include a statement of the purpose of the statute
within its text.2 4 7 Rather, the court found that the very title of the
Act, ("Military Honor and Decency Act"), enunciated its pur-
241. See id.
242. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
243. Id. at 802.
244. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 283-85. Congress is explicitly empowered
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, of the Constitution to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Id. To ensure that the
armed forces will be prepared for combat, Congress is empowered to enact de-
tailed laws, regulations, and directives designed to ensure that discipline is main-
tained. See id. "Military law" is a generic term that refers to the delivery of legal
services to the military. See id. This term is defined in the Preamble to the 1984
Manual for Courts-Martial as follows:
Military law consists of the statutes governing the military establishment
and the regulations issued thereunder, the constitutional powers of the
President and the regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent au-
thority of military commanders. Military law includes jurisdiction exer-
cised by courts-martial and the jurisdiction exercised by commanders
with respect to non-judicial punishment. The purpose of military law is
to... promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment,
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.
Id. (citing Manual for Courts' Martial, United States, 1984, at I-1 (1984)).
245. See id. at 284-85.
246. In Parker v. Levy, the Court recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. See 417 U.S. 733, 742 (1974).
The Court explained that the basis for this difference stems from the fact that "it is
the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should
the occasion arise." United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
247. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 283.
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pose.2 48 Accordingly, the General Media court concluded that the
Act did not violate the First Amendment.2 49
B. The Dissent
Judge Parker's dissent contended that courts must strike a bal-
ance between deference to the military and safeguarding constitu-
tional freedoms. 250 Judge Parker agreed with the majority that the
military forum was non-public, but he disagreed with the majority's
characterization of the Act as content-based discrimination. 251 In-
stead, Judge Parker suggested that, by targeting "lascivious" displays
of nudity, the Act discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.252 He
explained:
Portrayals of nude men and women designed to elicit a
sexual response illustrate an idea: that lust or sexual desire
is good, that men and women are sexual beings, or, if de-
picted in a submissive way, that women or men are submis-
sive objects for humiliation or domination. Depictions of
nude men and women in nonsubmissive ways, or in ways
not designed to arouse, are permitted under the Act. This
is... viewpoint discrimination. 253
After concluding that the Act constituted viewpoint discrimina-
tion, Justice Parker stated that such laws "are traditionally subject
to the highest level of review."254 He acknowledged, however, that
the doctrine of military deference lowers this standard.255 Judge
Parker suggested that even under the less strict "intermediate stan-
dard," the government failed to meet its burden.256 The govern-
248. See id.
249. See id. at 285. The court also held the Act was not void for vagueness and
dismissed GMC's Equal Protection Claim. See id. at 286-88.
250. See id. at 288 (Parker, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 289-91.
252. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 290-91 (Parker, J., dissenting). The Act
defined lascivious as "lewd and intended or designed to elicit a sexual response."
Id. at 290 (Parker, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (Parker, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 291-92 (Parker, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 292 (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker stated, "it is clear that,
on a military base, some regulations that restrict speech because of the message
conveyed are permissible." Id. (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker also noted
that judicial deference to the military decreases as the challenged speech or con-
duct becomes less harmful to the military mission. See id. (Parker, J., dissenting).
256. See id. at 292 (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker "found" an intermedi-
ate standard of review used in Brown v. Glines. See id. at 292 (Parker, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980)). In Brown, the Supreme Court
upheld a regulation authorizing a base commander to exclude literature that con-
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ment failed because it only offered post-hoc rationalizations for
the Act.257 There was no evidence of congressional history or mili-
tary considerations to prove that the actual sale of sexually explicit
materials on base would tarnish the military's image of honor, pro-
fessionalism and proper decorum.258 Judge Parker cautioned that
courts must not defer to every unsubstantiated military
regulation. 259
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals mischaracterized the Military Honor and De-
cency Act as a reasonable content-based regulation. 260 Due to this
mischaracterization, the court approved a statute that actually dis-
criminated on the impermissible basis of viewpoint. In classifying
the Act as a content-based restriction, the Second Circuit avoided
the opportunity to determine which standard of review should ap-
ply to viewpoint-based restrictions occurring in the military con-
text.2 61 This mischaracterization springs from a line of Supreme
Court cases which fails to articulate a clear standard as to how or
when the military can restrict constitutional rights. 2 6 2 The law is
further complicated by the Supreme Court's adherence to the con-
flicting degrees of deference given to the military.263
stituted "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops." Brown, 444
U.S. at 350. The Court upheld the regulations because they "restrict[ed] speech
no more than [was] reasonably necessary to protect the substantial government
interest." Id. at 355.
257. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 293 (Parker, J., dissenting).
258. See id. (Parker, J., dissenting). The government offered no factual proof
to support its assertions that sale of lascivious materials would negatively affect
the military. See id. (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker stated that a conjectural
"risk" is not enough. See id. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-74 (1981)
(upholding military registration regulation challenged on Equal Protection
grounds after deferring to extensive national attention and public debate, report
of Senate Armed Services Committee, hearings held by both houses, and various
committees).
259. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 193-94. (ParkerJ., dissenting).
260. See id. at 287-88.
261. See id. at 287.
262. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 112-79 and accompanying
text.
263. The nature of the Court's deference has varied considerably. Compare
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (holding tort suits against military non-
justiciable), Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (refusing to review discrimi-
nation claims against military), Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57 (1981) (engaging in com-
plete deference to military with no substantive interest balancing) and Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (applying standard of extreme military deference
to Free Exercise claim) with Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (considering rela-
tionship between challenged rule and core military function) and Schlesinger v.
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In addition, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the pa-
rameters of the prohibition against viewpoint regulation in non-
public forums.264 By categorizing the Act as a content-based restric-
tion and by holding that the act is valid in light of the military's
interests, the court avoided the uncertainty surrounding deference
to military judgement and the differences between discrimination
based on content and viewpoint. As a result, the Second Circuit
may have sacrificed First Amendment protections by applying an
overly deferential standard of review.
A. Viewpoint-Based Regulation
Categorizing the Act as a content-based restriction enabled the
General Media court to conclude that the Act was reasonable in light
of relevant military interests.265 The majority rejected the argu-
ment that the Act targeted a viewpoint by banning materials that
depict nudity "in a lascivious way."26 6 To support its conclusion that
"lascivious" is an adjective describing subject matter, rather than a
method to suppress a particular viewpoint, the court relied on dicta
in RA. V v. City of St. Paul.26 7 In KA. V, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that a state may prohibit obscenity that involves the most
lascivious displays of sexual activity.268 The General Media majority
believed that the RKA.V Court treated lascivious as an adjective. 269
Such a characterization, however, does not advance the inquiry. As
Justice Parker explained in his dissent, "viewpoints and subject mat-
ters are both identified by some adjective, the question is whether
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (finding nexus between regulation and core military
interest), Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (reviewing merits and balancing
interests) and Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (same).
264. See Post, supra note 183, at 1832 ("At some point or another the Court
will have to... clarify the circumstances under which viewpoint discrimination will
override warranted deference.").
265. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 282.
266. Id.
267. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In his dissent,Justice Parker argued that the major-
ity's reliance on R.A. V. was misguided:
Not only is nonobscene sexually explicit speech protected, unlike the ob-
scene speech which is the subject of the Supreme Court's hypothetical,
but to exclude only the most lascivious displays of sexual activity still al-
lows in the "marketplace of ideas" the views expressed by lascivious dis-
plays of sexual activity, even if it prohibits the most extreme of those
views.
Id. at 291 (Parker, J., dissenting).
268. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388. "A State might choose to prohibit only that
obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience." Id.
269. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 282.
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the statute will skew one side of a debate." 270 Preventing the sale of
magazines depicting lascivious displays of nudity censors a view-
point that depicts the human body as an object of lust or desire.2 7'
Debate is skewed when magazines containing non-lascivious nudity
are allowed to be sold in the military marketplace. 272 By upholding
the regulation, the General Media court contradicted the Supreme
Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel, where the Court ruled that deny-
ing access to a speaker solely to suppress a point of view on an
otherwise protected subject, skews debate and constitutes viewpoint
discrimination. 273 In sum, the General Media court should have clas-
sified the Military Honor and Decency Act as a viewpoint-based
speech regulation.
B. Determining the Proper Standard of Review
Had the General Media court characterized the law as a view-
point-based regulation, the court would have faced considerable
uncertainty in determining whether the prohibition against view-
point discrimination could be overcome by the policy of military
deference.274 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet clari-
fied the law in this area. 275 Prior cases involving constitutional chal-
lenges against the military provide some guidance.2 76 The Court
has established a deferential review that weakens, and sometimes
abrogates, constitutional protections. 277 Indeed, the Court's defer-
ence is "often so extensive as to raise the question whether judicial
review is even applicable."278 Nonetheless, the First Amendment
remains justiciable, at least in theory.279 For example, before the
Goldman Court engaged in an unprecedented standard of defer-
270. See id. at 290 (Parker, J., dissenting).
271. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 290 (Parker, J., dissenting).
272. See id.
273. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union, Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 385 (1993).
274. See Post, supra note 183, at 1829 ("An important and unresolved question
of public forum doctrine is whether the prohibition against viewpoint discrimina-
tion will override warranted deference.").
275. See id. at 1828. Compare Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (reviewing
merits of case before deferring to military judgement) with Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (complete deference without review on merits).
276. For a brief discussion of these cases, see supra notes 111-79 and accompa-
nying text.
277. See Rostker v Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981). Within the military, ab-
stract government interests are deemed so critical as to alter the standard of judi-
cial review. See id.
278. Dienes, supra note 111, at 799.
279. See id. at 804.
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ence, Justice Rehnquist paid homage to the principle that the First
Amendment limits military censorship. 280 Goldman highlights the
Court's willingness to abrogate constitutional safeguards in favor of
the military mission. Strong concurring and dissenting opinions,
however, signal that Goldman may have been improperly decided
and that the Court will continue to require a "reasonable relation-
ship" between regulations of speech and military interests.2 81
A review of Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court is
more willing to defer to the military on matters that concern core
military functions.28 2 This approach comports with the notion that
core military matters affect important internal management func-
tions, and therefore, warrant close regulation similar to the internal
management of speech.28 3 Accordingly, in Greer v. Spock, the Court
upheld a regulation requiring political activists to obtain permis-
sion from a base commander before demonstrating. The Court
considered boosting military morale an internal management func-
tion.2 84 Viewpoint discrimination is allowed when regulating inter-
nal speech.28 5 Therefore, the Greer Court upheld the viewpoint-
based restriction.28 6
Thus, the proper analysis for evaluating viewpoint-based
speech restrictions in the military forum is: (1) whether the re-
stricted speech attains an internal management function; and (2)
whether it targets specific institutional goals.28 7 At least one com-
mentator has suggested that, when the relationship between the dis-
crimination and the attainment of organizational goals is not
immediately apparent, deference should not override the prohibi-
280. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509. Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent:
The Court rejects Captain Goldman's claim without even the slightest at-
tempt to weigh his asserted right to free exercise of his religion against
the interests of the Air Force in uniformity of dress within the military
hospital. No test for free exercise claims in the military context is even
articulated, much less applied.
Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 510-33.
282. Compare Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (deferring to
military regulation that governed discharge procedures, and challenged on Equal
Protection grounds, because it had direct relationship to core military function of
establishing military leadership) with Fonterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(not deferring to military judgement concerning necessity of unequal benefit pro-
cedure because not related to "core military function").
283. See Post, supra note 183, at 1828.
284. See id. at 1829.
285. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (upholding viewpoint
regulation banning political speeches unapproved by base commander).
286. See id.
287. See Post, supra note 183, at 1832.
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tion against viewpoint discrimination. 288 This determination in-
volves significant fact-finding and post-hoc rationalizations will not
suffice. 289 In General Media, the government did not meet this
burden.
VI. IMPACT
The special needs of the military may impose constraints on
First Amendment rights that would not be acceptable in civilian so-
ciety, but there must be a meaningful justification for such addi-
tional constraints. When the military regulates speech on the basis
of content, courts are clearly justified in deferring to the military
mission. When the military regulates on the basis of viewpoint,
however, courts should apply a more stringent First Amendment
review. The military should be required to demonstrate a substan-
tial justification for imposing significant burdens on freedom of ex-
pression, and the military's means must closely fit its objectives. 290
Such a standard of review will provide much needed flexibility.
Applying the rigid Perry public-forum analysis, with its flat prohibi-
tion against viewpoint discrimination in non-public forums, forces
courts to characterize discrimination as based on either content or
viewpoint. Because a content-based restriction permits circumven-
tion of strict scrutiny in certain contexts, courts may characterize
speech in a manner that will permit a deferential result. The Gen-
eral Media decision represents this type of situation.
Courts should be free to find viewpoint discrimination without
fear of invoking the absolute ban on viewpoint discrimination.
Rather, greater inquiry into the rationale and support for uphold-
ing a viewpoint-based prohibition should be dispositive. This more
flexible approach would allow for interests to be balanced. Such a
288. See id.
289. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 294-95 (Parker, J., dissenting). Justice
Parker agreed with the district court that there was no evidence on the record "to
show that the actual sale or rental of sexually explicit material-as opposed to its
possession-causes the alleged harm to the military's core values and appearance to
the civilian world." Id. at 294. Justice Parker found inconsistency in the fact that
cigarettes and alcohol are sold on military bases, yet the military certainly does not
endorse smoking and drinking. See id. Additionally, Justice Parker suggested the
military could always place a sign disclaiming approval of the sale of sexually lasciv-
ious materials. See id.
290. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-74 (1981) (upholding mili-
tary registration regulation challenged on Equal Protection grounds after defer-
ring to extensive national attention and public debate, report of Senate Armed
Services Committee, hearings held by both houses, and various committees);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 740-41 (1974) (noting that district court relied on
"the voluminous record of the military proceedings").
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weighted balancing standard would amply pr6tect military interests,
and at the same time accommodate the vital principal of freedom
of expression.
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